Enforce peer revocation on reused connections
A revoked peer retains a long-lived authenticated connection.
- Focused work estimate
- 3h 30m + prerequisites
- Priority in the scenario
- High
- Engineering practice
- Revocation · Networking
Estimated field mix
- Security60%
- Networking40%
Field percentages are editorial estimates of the ticket's engineering focus. They total 100%; they are not measured time, proficiency scores, or ownership evidence.
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Project context
A fictional internal report exporter uses mutual TLS. Certificates are renewed manually, and operators cannot distinguish peer identity failures from network outages.
Setup prerequisites
- Generate disposable test-only certificate authorities and leaf certificates for loopback services; use no production keys.
Preceding work
Complete these dependencies, or supply their agreed outputs before taking this ticket.
- BMTLS-101 · Define expected service names and certificate usage
- BMTLS-102 · Validate certificate chains without disabling hostname checks
- BMTLS-103 · Separate certificate expiry alerts from connection failure rates
- BMTLS-104 · Refresh connection pools after client-certificate rotation
- BMTLS-105 · Keep TLS errors from exposing peer secrets or request payloads
- BMTLS-106 · Rehearse leaf renewal under an unchanged trust anchor
- BMTLS-107 · Rotate trust anchors without accepting unrelated authorities
Acceptance criteria
- Define revocation checks and maximum connection lifetime.
- Stop new requests for revoked peer identity.
- Close or drain existing connections according to the incident policy.
Implementation constraints
- Revocation policy must state its bounded enforcement delay.
Verification to include
- Revoke an idle authenticated peer.
- Attempt reuse and verify denial within the declared bound.
Deliverables
- Revocation enforcement tests.
Rollout and recovery
Rehearse revocation before relying on certificate identity for sensitive operations.
Value of the work
For the engineer: Practice transport identity, trust-store changes, and certificate failure diagnosis.
For the team: Provide repeatable rotation and recovery behavior for authenticated service communication.
Evidence boundaries
Outcome Evidence: Tests, patches, and runbooks are requested deliverables. They become Outcome Evidence only through a qualified Mission and immutable Evidence IDs.
Ownership Evidence: Independent adaptation must be observed under a declared verification policy and cite immutable Evidence IDs. Completing a planning ticket establishes no Ownership Evidence.