Prevent untrusted pull requests from receiving release secrets
The same reusable workflow handles internal branches and external pull requests, and a broad token is present before trust is evaluated.
- Focused work estimate
- 6h + prerequisites
- Priority in the scenario
- High
- Engineering practice
- CI security · Least privilege · Supply chain
Estimated field mix
- DevOps60%
- Security40%
Field percentages are editorial estimates of the ticket's engineering focus. They total 100%; they are not measured time, proficiency scores, or ownership evidence.
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Project context
A fictional TypeScript monorepo has twelve packages and a local CI simulator. Pull requests wait for redundant work, stale caches occasionally pass broken changes, and superseded runs continue consuming executors. Create synthetic package graphs and fake check APIs; no hosted CI credentials or production repositories are supplied.
Setup prerequisites
- Dependency graphs
- Process exit codes
- Test isolation
Preceding work
Complete these dependencies, or supply their agreed outputs before taking this ticket.
Acceptance criteria
- Trust context is resolved before selecting credentials or privileged jobs
- Untrusted revisions receive read-only checkout and no protected environment
- Privileged continuation binds the reviewed immutable revision
Implementation constraints
- Use fake secret handles and repository events; never place a credential value in fixtures or logs.
Verification to include
- Run trusted and untrusted event fixtures and compare granted capabilities.
- Change the revision after approval and confirm privileged jobs refuse to start.
Deliverables
- CI trust-boundary policy and event matrix
Rollout and recovery
Fail closed for ambiguous event provenance.
Value of the work
For the engineer: Practice treating CI as a versioned delivery system with correctness, latency, and recovery constraints.
For the team: Review a pipeline that reduces wasted compute without allowing stale or skipped checks to approve changes.
Evidence boundaries
Outcome Evidence: Tests, patches, and runbooks are requested deliverables. They become Outcome Evidence only through a qualified Mission and immutable Evidence IDs.
Ownership Evidence: Independent adaptation must be observed under a declared verification policy and cite immutable Evidence IDs. Completing a planning ticket establishes no Ownership Evidence.