{ "policy": { "version": 5, "patterns": { "version": 1, "method": "CURATED_PRACTICE_TOPIC", "notice": "Pattern topics identify design choices to practice. Read the ticket's acceptance criteria and justify the simplest suitable approach. Tags are not capability or ownership evidence; an untagged ticket has no curated pattern topic assigned." }, "fieldMix": { "version": 1, "method": "CURATED_ESTIMATE", "notice": "Field percentages are editorial estimates of the ticket's engineering focus. They total 100%; they are not measured time, proficiency scores, or ownership evidence." }, "contentStatus": "PRACTICE_BRIEF", "assessmentStatus": "NOT_QUALIFIED", "evidenceUse": "NONE", "aiPolicy": "AI tools are welcome during implementation. Record assumptions, review the result, and verify its behavior.", "notice": "Fictional engineering practice briefs. Starter repositories, fixtures, automated grading, and verified ownership are not included.", "outcomeEvidence": "Tests, patches, and runbooks are requested deliverables. They become Outcome Evidence only through a qualified Mission and immutable Evidence IDs.", "ownershipEvidence": "Independent adaptation must be observed under a declared verification policy and cite immutable Evidence IDs. Completing a planning ticket establishes no Ownership Evidence." }, "patternTopics": [ { "id": "factory-method", "label": "Factory Method", "group": "Creational" }, { "id": "abstract-factory", "label": "Abstract Factory", "group": "Creational" }, { "id": "builder", "label": "Builder", "group": "Creational" }, { "id": "prototype", "label": "Prototype", "group": "Creational" }, { "id": "singleton", "label": "Singleton", "group": "Creational" }, { "id": "adapter", "label": "Adapter", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "bridge", "label": "Bridge", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "composite", "label": "Composite", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "decorator", "label": "Decorator", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "facade", "label": "Facade", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "flyweight", "label": "Flyweight", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "proxy", "label": "Proxy", "group": "Structural" }, { "id": "chain-of-responsibility", "label": "Chain of Responsibility", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "command", "label": "Command", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "interpreter", "label": "Interpreter", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "iterator", "label": "Iterator", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "mediator", "label": "Mediator", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "memento", "label": "Memento", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "observer", "label": "Observer", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "state", "label": "State", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "strategy", "label": "Strategy", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "template-method", "label": "Template Method", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "visitor", "label": "Visitor", "group": "Behavioral" }, { "id": "ports-and-adapters", "label": "Ports and Adapters", "group": "Architectural" }, { "id": "cqrs", "label": "CQRS", "group": "Architectural" }, { "id": "strangler-fig", "label": "Strangler Fig", "group": "Architectural" }, { "id": "saga", "label": "Saga", "group": "Distributed and reliability" }, { "id": "transactional-outbox", "label": "Transactional Outbox", "group": "Distributed and reliability" }, { "id": "circuit-breaker", "label": "Circuit Breaker", "group": "Distributed and reliability" }, { "id": "bulkhead", "label": "Bulkhead", "group": "Distributed and reliability" } ], "projects": [ { "id": "4ff1df46-8579-4752-8e91-ea387b17a173", "key": "AAUDIT", "title": "Make privileged support actions inspectable", "field": "Security", "summary": "Constrain support elevation and preserve trustworthy audit records.", "context": "A fictional support console can reveal protected account settings and run repairs. The team needs bounded elevation, clear reasons and durable records of what happened.", "stack": [ "TypeScript", "PostgreSQL", "REST" ], "prerequisites": [ "Create synthetic support actors and organizations.", "Implement a local authorization boundary and append-only audit store." ], "developerValue": "Practice privileged workflows, denial paths and audit integrity.", "companyValue": "Review accountable support operations without unnecessary access to customer data.", "delivery": "Ten scoped tickets across three phases. Build a synthetic local service or select a ticket after recreating its prerequisites; estimates exclude setup.", "phases": [ { "id": "access", "title": "Constrain elevated access", "goal": "Define permission, purpose and expiry." }, { "id": "actions", "title": "Guard privileged mutations", "goal": "Bind changes to reviewed scope and durable records." }, { "id": "review", "title": "Review and recover", "goal": "Inspect events and respond to missing audit coverage." } ], "tickets": [ { "id": "5cfc3967-3cd4-468b-b6f1-bb3136c128f3", "key": "AAUDIT-101", "title": "List support actions with required permission and disclosure level", "type": "TASK", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "FOUNDATIONAL", "estimateMinutes": 90, "phaseId": "access", "dependsOn": [], "scenario": "Support agents share an admin role because nobody has separated read diagnostics from account-changing actions.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Classify each action by permission and exposed fields.", "Default unknown actions to denied.", "Keep read-only diagnostics separate from mutation authority." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use six concrete fictional support actions." ], "verification": [ "Map an allowed diagnostic read to its minimal permission.", "Attempt an unlisted action and deny it before data access." ], "deliverables": [ "Support permission matrix" ], "rollout": "Review the matrix before enabling new actions; retain unknown operations as disabled.", "skills": [ "Authorization design", "Least privilege" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 100 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "27460c62-35a2-47b5-8473-80aca55610ea", "key": "AAUDIT-102", "title": "Require a bounded purpose record before support elevation", "type": "STORY", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "INTERMEDIATE", "estimateMinutes": 150, "phaseId": "access", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-101" ], "scenario": "An agent opens account settings using permanent elevated access with no connection to a support case.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Record target organization, permitted actions, reason and expiry.", "Require an authorized actor to request elevation.", "Reject empty purpose or an excessive lifetime." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use synthetic case references without copying case conversations." ], "verification": [ "Create a scoped time-limited elevation.", "Request a different organization's action outside the grant and deny it." ], "deliverables": [ "Elevation request contract" ], "rollout": "Canary grants for synthetic actors; revoke active test grants if policy checks fail.", "skills": [ "Privileged access", "Scoping" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 80 }, { "field": "Backend", "percentage": 20 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "852a8172-3b5f-4daa-a24e-dfd85939bdcc", "key": "AAUDIT-103", "title": "Remove sensitive account fields from ordinary support search", "type": "BUG", "priority": "HIGH", "difficulty": "FOUNDATIONAL", "estimateMinutes": 75, "phaseId": "access", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-101", "AAUDIT-102" ], "scenario": "Searching by account ID returns confidential settings before the agent opens an elevated support session.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Ordinary search returns an explicit minimal projection.", "Protected details require the exact active grant.", "Denied search responses do not reveal account existence across scope." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Define response schemas at the service boundary." ], "verification": [ "Find an account using permitted safe fields.", "Search outside scope and inspect response and logs for protected fields." ], "deliverables": [ "Minimal support search projection" ], "rollout": "Deploy projection before elevation rollout; disable broad debug search endpoints.", "skills": [ "Privacy", "Response schemas" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Privacy engineering", "percentage": 60 }, { "field": "Security", "percentage": 40 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "38ac938d-1c35-4e75-a675-4b31510289c9", "key": "AAUDIT-104", "title": "Reauthorize elevation immediately before a support repair commits", "type": "BUG", "priority": "HIGH", "difficulty": "ADVANCED", "estimateMinutes": 240, "phaseId": "actions", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-102", "AAUDIT-103" ], "scenario": "An agent starts a repair, loses access, then the pending request commits using the authorization decision from several minutes earlier.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Reload actor and grant authority in the mutation transaction.", "Check target scope, permitted operation and expiry.", "Revoked or expired grants leave domain state unchanged." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use controlled barriers to model revocation between read and commit." ], "verification": [ "Commit a repair under an active matching grant.", "Revoke at the barrier and verify rollback with no repair effect." ], "deliverables": [ "Commit-boundary authorization guard" ], "rollout": "Canary the guard on synthetic repairs; disable repair writes if authorization freshness fails.", "skills": [ "Authorization races", "Transactions" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 60 }, { "field": "Database engineering", "percentage": 40 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "569e31a3-4195-474d-8906-f89f78602f4b", "key": "AAUDIT-105", "title": "Commit privileged repair state and its audit fact together", "type": "TASK", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "ADVANCED", "estimateMinutes": 210, "phaseId": "actions", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-104" ], "scenario": "A repair succeeds while the audit insert fails, leaving an unrecorded privileged change.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Persist repair and audit fact in one transaction.", "Audit captures actor, grant, action and safe target identity.", "Audit failure rolls back the repair." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Keep payload contents and secrets out of the audit record." ], "verification": [ "Commit a synthetic repair and inspect one matching audit fact.", "Force audit persistence failure and verify unchanged domain state." ], "deliverables": [ "Atomic repair audit and failure test" ], "rollout": "Deploy transactional writes before exposing repairs; stop mutation if audit storage is unavailable.", "skills": [ "Audit integrity", "Transactions" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Database engineering", "percentage": 50 }, { "field": "Security", "percentage": 50 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "76e3860b-0a82-43df-95c2-577565cb796d", "key": "AAUDIT-106", "title": "Make support repair commands replay-safe without repeating side effects", "type": "STORY", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "EXPERT", "estimateMinutes": 300, "phaseId": "actions", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-105" ], "scenario": "The console retries a repair after a timeout, generating a second account reset and confusing the support trail.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Bind idempotency to actor, grant, target and operation input.", "Return the original result for identical retries.", "Reject changed parameters under the same key." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Audit the logical operation once and retain safe retry observations separately." ], "verification": [ "Lose a post-commit response and retry to one repair.", "Reuse the command key for another target and deny it." ], "deliverables": [ "Idempotent support repair command" ], "rollout": "Canary with disposable accounts; pause conflicting command keys for investigation.", "skills": [ "Idempotency", "Privileged workflows" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 60 }, { "field": "Backend", "percentage": 40 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "b05ef40f-26f0-4a71-bd62-b15bcd17ac9a", "key": "AAUDIT-107", "title": "Expire support grants without relying on a cleanup job", "type": "TASK", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "INTERMEDIATE", "estimateMinutes": 150, "phaseId": "actions", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-104", "AAUDIT-106" ], "scenario": "A delayed cleanup worker leaves expired support sessions usable throughout an outage.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Every privileged authorization checks the stored expiry.", "Cleanup only archives derived state and cannot extend authority.", "Use one documented exact-expiry boundary." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use an injected UTC clock at the service boundary." ], "verification": [ "Authorize a matching action immediately before expiry.", "Advance to expiry while cleanup is paused and deny the action." ], "deliverables": [ "Expiry enforcement and paused-cleanup test" ], "rollout": "Enable boundary checks before cleanup changes; revoke grants if clock assumptions are violated.", "skills": [ "Temporal authorization", "Fail-closed design" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 100 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "e0b77682-3f97-449e-8e52-e9f01b00bdaf", "key": "AAUDIT-108", "title": "Provide a scoped audit timeline with stable cursor pagination", "type": "STORY", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "INTERMEDIATE", "estimateMinutes": 180, "phaseId": "review", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-105", "AAUDIT-107" ], "scenario": "Security reviewers need to inspect a repair sequence, but an unbounded audit endpoint times out and exposes unrelated organizations.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Filter by authorized organization and bounded time window.", "Order by committed sequence with a stable cursor.", "Return safe action metadata without repair payloads." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Reject cursors bound to another scope." ], "verification": [ "Page a synthetic incident timeline while new events arrive.", "Tamper with scope in a cursor and return a nondisclosing denial." ], "deliverables": [ "Audit timeline endpoint and scope tests" ], "rollout": "Expose read-only timelines to a review role; revoke the route if projection checks fail.", "skills": [ "Pagination", "Audit review" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 40 }, { "field": "API design", "percentage": 30 }, { "field": "Database engineering", "percentage": 30 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "2704a99f-3201-4fc9-ad56-c077ee4d7a70", "key": "AAUDIT-109", "title": "Detect missing privileged audit coverage using domain references", "type": "CHORE", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "EXPERT", "estimateMinutes": 300, "phaseId": "review", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-105", "AAUDIT-108" ], "scenario": "A legacy repair path may still bypass the transactional audit method; reviewers need a precise way to find uncovered changes.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Compare privileged operation references with audit identities.", "Report missing and contradictory links separately.", "Do not invent audit facts for historical gaps." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use bounded synthetic data and a read-only reconciliation command." ], "verification": [ "Reconcile a complete operation history with no gaps.", "Remove one audit reference in a fixture and report explicit incomplete coverage." ], "deliverables": [ "Audit coverage reconciler" ], "rollout": "Run read-only before enabling legacy repair paths; disable uncovered writes until corrected.", "skills": [ "Integrity verification", "Uncertainty" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 60 }, { "field": "Quality engineering", "percentage": 40 } ], "patterns": [] }, { "id": "a1ce5baf-db80-43d4-85ba-2c03c12c8d4d", "key": "AAUDIT-110", "title": "Rehearse termination of an active support elevation incident", "type": "TASK", "priority": "MEDIUM", "difficulty": "FOUNDATIONAL", "estimateMinutes": 120, "phaseId": "review", "dependsOn": [ "AAUDIT-107", "AAUDIT-108", "AAUDIT-109" ], "scenario": "A fictional support account is suspected of misuse while one elevated request is still running.", "acceptanceCriteria": [ "Runbook revokes grants and checks in-flight commit protection.", "Preserve immutable audit facts and record coverage limits.", "Verify ordinary support access remains scoped after containment." ], "implementationNotes": [ "Use only synthetic actors and repairs." ], "verification": [ "Contain an active grant and verify later actions are denied.", "Pause a repair before commit, revoke authority, and confirm no mutation completes." ], "deliverables": [ "Support containment runbook and drill trace" ], "rollout": "Rehearse locally before release; keep repairs disabled if containment cannot be verified.", "skills": [ "Incident response", "Operational verification" ], "fieldMix": [ { "field": "Security", "percentage": 60 }, { "field": "Site reliability", "percentage": 40 } ], "patterns": [] } ] } ] }